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The emergence of the novel Middle East (ME) respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has raised 
global public health concerns regarding the cur-
rent situation and its future evolution. Here we pro-
pose an integrative maximum likelihood analysis 
of both cluster data in the ME and importations in a 
set of European countries to assess the transmission 
scenario and incidence of sporadic infections. Our 
approach is based on a spatial-transmission model 
integrating mobility data worldwide and allows for 
variations in the zoonotic/environmental transmission 
and under-ascertainment. Maximum likelihood esti-
mates for the ME, considering outbreak data up to 31 
August 2013, indicate the occurrence of a subcritical 
epidemic with a reproductive number R of 0.50 (95% 
confidence interval (CI): 0.30–0.77) associated with a 
daily rate of sporadic introductions psp of 0.28 (95% CI: 
0.12–0.85). Infections in the ME appear to be mainly 
dominated by zoonotic/environmental transmissions, 
with possible under-ascertainment (ratio of estimated 
to observed (0.116) sporadic cases equal to 2.41, 
95% CI: 1.03–7.32). No time evolution of the situation 
emerges. Analyses of flight passenger data from ME 
countries indicate areas at high risk of importation. 
While dismissing an immediate threat for global health 
security, this analysis provides a baseline scenario for 
future reference and updates, suggests reinforced sur-
veillance to limit under-ascertainment, and calls for 
alertness in high importation risk areas worldwide.
Introduction
As of 31 August 2013, a total of 108 laboratory-con-
firmed cases of human infection with the Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) have 
been reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) 
[1]. Since the first identification of the virus in 2012 [2], 
a rapid coordinated response has been put in place to 
confront the novel emerging epidemic. This response 
consisted in the enhancement of surveillance systems, 
the provision of updated information on the epidemic 
situation, technical guidance for the clinical manage-
ment of probable infections [3-7], and the search for 
the possible virus reservoir [8,9]. There are still many 
uncertainties about various aspects of the outbreak, 
including its full geographical extent, a possible exten-
sion of an initial virus reservoir to other hosts, the 
transmission path of the infection to humans and the 
associated risk. All these aspects call for heightened 
surveillance, enhanced investigations and the devel-
opment and application of epidemiological methods 
to assess the epidemic situation and determine the 
potential of the virus to spread in humans and to circu-
late at a global scale. 
In such a situation, statistical, mathematical and com-
putational methods allow estimating key epidemio-
logical parameters from available data, under various 
assumptions and accounting for the many uncertain-
ties. The reproductive number R, i.e. the average 
number of secondary cases generated by a primary 
case, is a key summary measure of the transmissibil-
ity of an emerging infection. A first estimation of the 
MERS-CoV reproductive number was based on the 
analysis of cluster-size data with assumed cluster 
partition in terms of transmission trees, highlighting 
the similarity of the current MERS-CoV situation to 
the pre-epidemic stage of the severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) outbreak [10]. Aside from the 
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transmissibility, an additional important characteristic 
of the epidemic remains unknown i.e. the incidence of 
infection. Observed cases may indeed only represent 
a proportion of the current epidemic, with a majority 
of infections going undetected because of mild illness 
or asymptomatic infection. This aspect also has further 
relevant implications for the correct estimation of other 
important overall statistics (e.g. the severity of the 
disease) and of the risk of importation of cases from 
affected areas to other locations of the world. Limited 
data may also hide important changes in the virus 
transmissibility related, for example, to viral adapta-
tions to humans that may alter its pandemic potential, 
thus presenting an additional challenge for the assess-
ment of the epidemic situation. 
To fill the gaps in current knowledge, we present 
here an innovative integrative maximum likelihood 
approach to describe the epidemic in the Middle East 
(ME) region, comprising Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. We synthesise evidence 
from multiple sources of information: sizes of clus-
ters of cases, traffic data, and imported cases outside 
the region. The methods used account for the limited 
information available and reporting inaccuracies. Our 
aim is to complete early findings on the MERS-CoV epi-
demic by focusing on the virus transmissibility from 
human-to-human, its possible changes in time, and 
the expected number of cases in the ME region. Based 
on international travel flows, the public health threat 
for other geographical locations not yet affected by the 
virus is also assessed.
Methods
Analytic overview
The integrative approach we use is based on a com-
bined maximum likelihood analysis to jointly estimate 
the reproductive number R and the daily rate psp of 
sporadic introduction of the virus in the population 
through zoonotic/environmental transmissions [11]. 
The integrative approach builds on two aspects of the 
currently reported outbreak – the distribution of clus-
ter sizes, providing information on R (Method 1), and 
the number of imported cases in countries out of the 
source region providing information on R and psp based 
on the fit of a stochastic spatial metapopulation model 
integrating aviation data worldwide (Method 2). 
Method 1
We considered laboratory-confirmed cases reported to 
WHO as of 31 August 2013 in the ME region including 
Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates 
[1] (Table 1). This region is also referred to as the 
source region in this study. The cases were distrib-
uted into clusters according to information found in 
WHO reports. Using this dataset as baseline data, we 
estimated the reproductive number R using the cluster 
sizes distribution. Several distributions can be used 
that correspond to different hypotheses regarding the 
number of secondary cases distribution (offspring dis-
tribution) [12]. In particular we considered a Poisson 
offspring distribution accounting for no overdispersion 
around a common mean [13] and a geometric offspring 
distribution assuming a constant rate of transmission 
during an exponentially distributed infectious period 
[14].
Table 1
Number of clusters of a given size, depending on the total number of cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
considered
Size of cluster
(number of cases)
Number of clustersa
Baseline (all laboratory-
confirmed cases in the ME 
regionb as of 31 August 2013) 
All laboratory-confirmed cases 
in the ME regionb as of 31 August 
2013, and the probable cases in 
the Jordan April 2012 outbreak
All laboratory-
confirmed cases 
worldwide as of 31 
August 2013
All laboratory confirmed-
cases in ME regionb as of 
31 May 2013
1c 42 42 44 16
2 8 7 10 2
3 2 2 4 1
5 2 2 2 0
10 0 1 0 0
22 1 1 1 1
Total number of cases 96 104 108 45
ME: Middle East.
a  Unless otherwise specified.
b  Including Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
c  Sporadic case.
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As cluster sizes may be biased downwards by incom-
plete observation, we allowed for uncertainty by 
assuming that each case in a cluster would go unob-
served with probability pcl during investigation ( pcl =0 
representing no missed cases). This corresponds to the 
following distribution for reported cluster sizes: 
where O is the observed size of the cluster, S its real 
size 
is the offspring distribution discussed above. 
Eventually, the likelihood was computed as
over a bi-dimensional grid of {R, pcl } values.
We performed a sensitivity analysis by considering: 
(i) the addition, to the baseline data, of the complete 
Jordan cluster including eight more cases (cluster 
size=10, Table 1) identified through a retrospective 
serology study carried out on 124 individuals [4,15]; (ii) 
all laboratory-confirmed cases (n=108) reported world-
wide to WHO as of 31 August 2013 [1]; (iii) laboratory-
confirmed cases in the ME region up to 31 May, 2013 
[1]. The corresponding cluster size data are reported in 
Table 1.
Method 2
Due to a large concern around the ongoing outbreak 
and enhanced surveillance following the WHO guide-
lines for patients returning from the affected area, the 
detection of probable cases imported in countries out 
of the ME region is expected to be more complete than 
in the region itself where primary cases may have gone 
undetected. Another source of information to estimate 
the reproductive number R, discounting possible noti-
fication/surveillance biases in the source region, is 
therefore provided by the importation of cases in newly 
affected countries [16,17]. As a basis for our estimation 
model, we use a method already employed for the esti-
mation of the seasonal transmission potential of the 
2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, which was based 
on the calibration of a global epidemic and mobility 
model (GLEAM) [18,19] to the chronology data of the 
2009 pandemic [17]. We modified and extended this 
method by accounting for the different transmission 
scenarios in the ME region. The method concurrently 
allows the estimation of the incidence of infection from 
sporadic cases in the region, and therefore provides a 
measure of possible under-ascertainment of cases.
GLEAM is based on a spatially structured metapopula-
tion approach comprising 3,362 subpopulations in 220 
countries in the world coupled through mobility con-
nections. The model is informed with high-resolution 
demographic data for six billion individuals and multi-
scale mobility data including the full air traffic data-
base from the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) and short-range ground mobility obtained from 
national commuting data [19]. The infection dynamics 
takes place within each subpopulation and assumes 
a modified susceptible, exposed, infectious, recov-
ered individuals (SEIR) compartmentalisation [20] to 
account for different transmission scenarios in the ME 
region [11]: (i) introduction of sporadic infections from 
zoonotic/environmental transmission with a daily rate 
psp and a uniform spatial distribution in the source 
region; (ii) modified human-to-human transmissibility 
with respect to standard homogeneous mixing in all 
subpopulations of the model to allow for large varia-
tions in the number of secondary cases produced by 
a given primary case. Epidemiological parameters for 
the compartmental model were based on the estimates 
obtained from the analysis of the outbreak data includ-
ing 22 cases at a healthcare facility in Al-Ahsa in Saudi 
Arabia [6], namely average latency period of 5.2 days 
and generation time of 7.6 days. 
The daily rate psp of sporadic cases emergence in the 
ME region and the reproductive number R are the free 
parameters of the model. For each set of values of 
these two parameters, GLEAM allows the generation 
of stochastic numerical realisations of the MERS-CoV 
outbreak simulating the local epidemic in the source 
region and the possibility of international dissemina-
tion through mobility processes entirely based on real 
data. We thus generate with a Monte Carlo procedure 
the probability distribution Pi(ni) of the number ni of 
imported MERS-CoV cases in country i out of the source 
region as of 31 August 2013 (4×103 stochastic realisa-
tions for each point (R, psp) of the space of parameters). 
Being all independent importation events, we can 
define a likelihood function
where nj* is the empirically observed number of 
imported cases per country (see schematic example 
in Figure 1). We further restrict our analysis to certain 
western European countries including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom, to focus on an area where respira-
tory diseases surveillance is homogeneous and with a 
high sensitivity to detect importations. We disregard 
other possible sources of heterogeneity. These data 
consisted therefore in: nj*=1 for France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom, and nj*=0 for all other west-
ern European countries j considered in the analysis 
(Figure 1). We estimated the log-likelihood over a bi-
dimensional grid of (R, psp) values and used bivariate 
linear interpolation over a refined grid.
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Figure 1
Maximum likelihood approach integrating two methods, to estimate the daily rate of sporadic cases of Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection and the reproductive number
GLEAM: global epidemic and mobility model; psp: daily rate of sporadic introduction of the virus in the population through zoonotic/
environmental transmissions; R: reproductive number.
In this maximum likelihood approach, the source region used comprises Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
Method 1 (bottom circle) is based on the maximum likelihood analysis of cluster size distribution obtained from laboratory-confirmed cases in 
the source region (countries in red in the zoomed area). 
Method 2 (top panel) is based on the maximum likelihood analysis on data on case importations in certain western European countries, as 
schematically indicated on the map (countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark , Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). For each point in the 
parameter space (R, psp) we run 4,000 stochastic GLEAM simulations from the same initial conditions and parameterised as described in the 
main text. With each run providing the simulated number of imported cases nj for a given country j, we can compare the resulting simulated 
probability distribution of nj with the observed value nj* for that country as of 31 August 2013, and compute a likelihood function for all 
western European countries included in the analysis. 
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Given the unknown geographical extension of the 
source of the MERS-CoV infection in the ME and its 
reservoir, we performed a sensitivity analysis by con-
sidering: (i) an extended definition of source region 
to neighbouring countries, thus additionally including 
Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Palestine, Syria, and Yemen (extended source region), 
based on travel recommendations [21]; (ii) a restricted 
source region localised only in Saudi Arabia, i.e. 
the country in the ME that reported the largest num-
ber of cases; (iii) a variation in the time of the initial 
emergence of the virus with transmission to humans, 
assuming that sporadic cases may be introduced up 
to two months before the known initial cases (Jordan 
cluster, April 2012 [4]), to allow for lack of identifica-
tion or detection prior to the Jordan cluster.
Integrative approach combining Methods  
1 and 2
Methods 1 and 2 were jointly combined in the following 
integrated likelihood function: 
owing to the independence of the two observed pro-
cesses (cluster sizes and importations). Maximum 
likelihood estimates were computed over the three-
dimensional (3D) grid (R, psp, pcl) and the deviance
was used to measure distance from the best fit. 
Associated confidence intervals were obtained by pro-
filing the deviance in the 3D space [22]. It is important 
to note that such estimates cannot be derived from the 
maximum likelihood analysis of each Method consid-
ered separately, nor conditionally one to the other, and 
the full computation of  
needs to be considered. In this respect, our integra-
tive approach represents a substantial advance with 
respect to prior work based on the analysis of cluster 
data only [10].
Table 2
Best estimate values for the reproductive number R and the daily rate psp of emergence of sporadic cases of Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus due to zoonotic or environmental transmissions
Analysis Data R (95% CI) psp (95% CI)
Baseline Baseline data: all laboratory-confirmed cases in the ME region
a 
up to 31 Aug 2013 0.50 (0.30–0.77) 0.28 (0.12–0.85)
Sensitivity
All laboratory-confirmed cases in the ME regionb as of 31 Aug 
2013, and the probable cases in the Jordan Apr 2012 outbreak 0.65 (0.34–0.80) 0.28 (0.12–0.83)
All laboratory-confirmed cases reported worldwide to WHO as 
of 31 Aug 2013 0.50 (0.31–0.77) 0.28 (0.12–0.85)
All laboratory-confirmed cases reported in an extended source 
region including ME region and neighbouring countriesb 0.50 (0.31–0.76) 0.14 (0.05–0.38)
c
Data considering a restricted source region limited to Saudi 
Arabia 0.60 (0.30–0.76) 4.73 (2.32–15.37)
c
Data considering all laboratory-confirmed cases in ME regiona 
as of 31 May 2013 0.54 (0.34–0.90) 0.43 (0.12–0.95)
Alternative baseline scenario Baseline data considering a Poisson offspring distribution 0.69 (0.34–0.79) 0.28 (0.12–0.71)
CI: confidence interval; ME: Middle East; WHO: World Health Organization.
Results for the baseline and for the scenarios of the sensitivity analysis are obtained assuming a geometric offspring distribution for the 
analysis of cluster data and for the best estimate of the uncertainty parameter, pcl. The last row of the Table refers to the baseline scenario 
considering a Poisson offspring distribution for the analysis of cluster data.
a  Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
b  Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen in addition to the ME region.
c  To be comparable with the other estimates, this value has been rescaled to take into account the change of population size of the source 
region; it thus represents the daily rate of sporadic cases scaled to the ME region.
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Air traffic data analysis
We additionally analysed the air traffic data integrated 
into GLEAM (direct flights from reference [19] account-
ing for traffic growth [23]) to evaluate the traffic capac-
ity of the airports in the ME region and to assess the 
importation risk of the countries belonging to other 
areas of the world than the western European countries 
previously considered. 
Results
The integrated analysis based on outbreak data up to 
31 August 2013 led to a R value equal to 0.50 (95% CI: 
0.30–0.77) and daily rate psp of MERS-CoV introduc-
tions into the human population in the ME region equal 
to 0.28 (95% CI: 0.12–0.85) (Table 2). These best esti-
mates were obtained considering a geometric offspring 
distribution, yielding higher maximum likelihood val-
ues in the analysis. The corresponding best estimate 
for uncertainty in the cluster distribution suggests a 
consistent fraction of cases missed in cluster investi-
gations (pcl=0.35; 95% CI: 0–0.85), but little impact of 
inaccuracies in reported cluster size on the estimates 
of the other parameters.
The estimated daily rate of sporadic cases in the ME 
region (psp=0.28; 95% CI: 0.12–0.85) can be compared 
to the observed value (p*sp=0.116), computed based 
on 60 sporadic cases reported between April 2012 
and 31 August 2013, including 42 sporadic cases and 
13 cluster index cases in the ME region (assuming that 
each cluster is originated by a single index case), as 
well as five laboratory-confirmed cases exported from 
the region (four to western Europe [1,3,5] and one to 
Tunisia [1]). This yields that the true number of cases 
from zoonotic/environmental transmission might be 
between 1.03- and 7.32-fold the observed number. 
Our estimates are very robust against the addition of 
cases out of the ME region to the distribution of clus-
ters sizes (R=0.50; 95% CI: 0.31–0.77; no change for 
psp). An increase in R, though with limited change in 
the associated confidence interval, is obtained if we 
include the full Jordan cluster of April 2012 by consid-
ering also cases retrospectively confirmed by serol-
ogy (R=0.65; 95% CI: 0.34–0.80); no variations are 
obtained in the confidence interval of the estimated 
daily rate of sporadic cases in the region (Table 2).
Similar results for the reproductive number are obtained 
when we consider variations in the geographical defi-
nition of the MERS-CoV source region. Extending the 
source region considered here to neighbouring coun-
tries does not affect the estimated basic reproductive 
number and associated confidence interval (R=0.50; 
95% CI: 0.31–0.76), but lowers the value of the daily 
rate of sporadic cases (psp=0.14; 95% CI: 0.05–
0.38). If we assume that the source region is instead 
restricted to Saudi Arabia, a substantial increase in psp 
is obtained (4.73; 95% CI: 2.32–15.37), with increase 
Figure 2
Air traffic capacity in the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus source region considered in this study and 
international destinations from this region 
MERS-CoV: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; UAE: United Arab Emirates.
Airports in the MERS-CoV source region (Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) are represented with a circle proportional to the daily traffic they 
handle (panel A). Their international traffic, out of the region, is broken down by continent of destination (panel B). Breakdown by country 
for the first 20 countries with highest traffic from the ME region: India (11.7%), Bahrain (8.7%), Pakistan (8.6%), United Kingdom (8.4%), 
Oman (5.8%), Egypt (5.2%), Kuwait (4.3%), Iran (3.6%), Germany (3.5%), Lebanon (2.9%), Bangladesh (2.8%), Thailand (2.5%), Sri Lanka 
(2.3%), Singapore (2.1%), Syria (2.0%), France (2.0%), Kenya (1.6%), Italy (1.5%), Malaysia (1.4%), Switzerland (1.4%). Statistics are based 
on the 2002 International Air Transport Association (IATA) air traffic data for direct flights integrated into the global epidemic and mobility 
model (GLEAM) [19] after accounting for traffic growth in the period from 2002 to 2011 [23]. 
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in the reproductive number and unaltered confidence 
interval (R=0.60; 95% CI: 0.30–0.76).
No variation in psp was observed in testing a differ-
ent hypothesis on the offspring distribution, whereas 
an increase for the best estimate of R was found (0.69 
when considering a Poisson offspring distribution vs. 
0.50 in the baseline, with similar CIs, Table 2). Larger 
CIs, but no significant variation in the parameters’ esti-
mates, were observed by considering empirical data up 
to the end of May (Table 2).
Analyses of traffic data expose large traffic fluxes 
towards the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa 
(Figure 2) from the ME region. Of the 20 countries with 
highest traffic from the ME region, six were found to 
neighbour this region (Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman and Syria), seven were identified in south Asia 
(Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand) and five, including Switzerland, 
were in Europe, and these comprised the four coun-
tries (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) 
reporting importation of cases from the affected area. 
Two countries (Egypt and Kenya) were also found in 
Africa. 
Discussion
Results of our integrative modeling approach suggest 
the occurrence of a subcritical MERS-CoV epidemic in 
the ME region, as quantified by a reproductive number 
smaller than one. The outbreak is not able to generate 
a self-sustaining epidemic in humans, and sporadic 
cases from zoonotic/environmental transmission are 
expected to represent a large fraction of the total size 
of the epidemic. 
The estimated CI for the reproductive number is found 
to be very stable across changes in the data interpre-
tation. In all cases, considering data up to 31 August 
2013, we found that it is highly unlikely (<5% prob-
ability) to have a MERS-CoV outbreak with R above 
0.80 or below 0.30. The variation of the best estimate 
from the baseline case (R=0.50) to the various sce-
narios explored as sensitivity analysis (up to R=0.69) 
is explained by the presence of a large region in the 
parameter space (R, psp) where the likelihood func-
tion shows small variation around its maximum value 
(darker red area in Figure 3). This is likely induced by 
the limited data available not allowing us to further 
narrow down the confidence intervals of the estimates. 
The analysis based on the integration of two independ-
ent methods allows us to provide an estimate for the 
daily rate of introductions of MERS-CoV infections in the 
human population in the ME region, in addition to the 
estimate for the reproductive number. The estimated 
95% CI in the baseline scenario (0.12–0.85) compared 
to the observed value (0.116) suggests a negligible to 
significant under-ascertainment rate for zoonotic/envi-
ronmental transmissions (1.03–7.32 times the reported 
sporadic cases), indicating that notified sporadic cases 
likely represent a substantial proportion of the total, 
but improved surveillance in the region including sero-
logical surveys around cases is needed. Since evidence 
for mild illness, as well as for a wide spectrum of clini-
cal disease, was observed [3,6], our findings are com-
patible with an under-ascertainment rate for zoonotic/
environmental transmissions that may be due in a large 
part to a selection bias towards cases of more severe 
illness, where patients having mild illnesses or asymp-
tomatic infections may go undetected [24]. 
The integrative approach allows us to overcome scarce 
data availability on the outbreak that may limit the sta-
tistical power of each of the approaches if considered 
separately. The combination of the likelihood functions 
indeed enables solving possible degeneracies and 
providing point estimates and confidence intervals for 
both parameters, R and psp.
Our estimates for the reproductive number are con-
sistent with the results of Breban et al. [10] – the only 
study to date reporting results on inter-human trans-
missibility – thus further confirming the robustness of 
our epidemic assessment. Our work presents however 
substantial differences in the methodology and in its 
achievable predictions as further discussed below.
Figure 3
Heatmap of deviance values versus reproductive number R 
and daily rate of sporadic cases psp 
Deviance was calculated as D(R,psp)=-2(log (R,psp )- 
max(log ) ) using the profiled log likelihood (for each pair  
(R,psp ), the uncertainty parameter pcl in cluster size distribution 
maximizing the log-likelihood  was chosen). Vertical and 
horizontal dashed lines show the maximum likelihood values for 
R and psp, respectively. Solid white curves contour the deviance-
based confidence regions of levels 95%, 99%, and 99.9%. The 
95% profiled confidence intervals for R and psp are highlighted in 
bold on the axes. 
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One major difference is that our integrative approach 
allows the quantification of sporadic cases under-
ascertainment through the estimate of the rate of intro-
duction of sporadic cases in the ME region, combined 
with the estimate for the reproductive number. In the 
study from Breban et al. [10], daily introductions are cal-
culated on the basis of the two assumed scenarios for 
the transmission trees, i.e. from the assumed number 
of index cases among the reported data. Our procedure 
instead makes no assumption on the completeness of 
reported data, or on the local transmission trees, and 
relies on alternative data sources (case importations) 
to estimate the number of sporadic cases in the region.
The cluster data analysis of Method 1 relies on the 
assumption that the final size of the cluster is observed 
and that each cluster is the result of human-to-human 
transmission starting from a single index case. The first 
hypothesis was almost met, since, as of 7 September 
2013, only two cases reported after 31 August 2013 
were later linked to the cases analysed here, with no 
impact on the reported estimates [25]. 
Considering the second hypothesis, while we allow 
for uncertainty in case detection in the close contact 
investigation, we do not consider the possibility of co-
exposure of epidemiologically linked cases to the same 
source of zoonotic/environmental infection, differently 
from Breban et al. [10]. In view of the persisting large 
uncertainties regarding the virus path of infection to 
humans and with insufficient data from epidemiologi-
cal investigations to reliably reconstruct transmission 
trees within clusters, we chose a worst-case assump-
tion for the transmissibility of the virus. This may lead 
to overestimating the reproductive number, however 
not affecting our conclusion on the subcritical nature 
of the current MERS-CoV epidemic. In addition, such 
assumption does not affect the estimate of the size of 
the epidemic in the affected region (Method 2), as this 
is based on case importations assuming no knowledge 
on the local transmissions, independently of their type 
(whether human-to-human or zoonotic/environmental). 
We considered the cluster analysis (Method 1) 
restricted to the ME region as we assumed a rather 
homogeneous implementation of control measures 
around cases that may be different from the one put 
in place in affected countries experiencing importation 
of cases, mainly due to the additional available knowl-
edge of travel history associated to imported cases. 
The extension of the analysis to all MERS-CoV clusters 
of laboratory-confirmed cases reported to WHO did 
not alter our estimates. The integrative approach also 
relies on the assumptions of homogeneous mixing in 
the local populations and homogeneous travel behav-
iour informed by traffic data (regardless e.g. of travel 
frequencies of specific population classes), similarly to 
previous studies [16,17]. This is due to the lack of data 
characterising interactions between travellers and 
local population, and characterising the demographic 
profile of passengers.
The spatial component of our approach allows us to 
shed light on additional aspects of the epidemic. If 
we assume that the source of MERS-CoV infection is 
restricted to Saudi Arabia, where the majority of cases 
has been observed, our estimates indicate that a much 
larger number of sporadic cases in the area would be 
needed to sustain the observed importation of cases in 
the western European countries considered (4.73 daily 
introductions of sporadic cases vs. 0.28 in the base-
line). The biggest airports, handling the vast majority 
of the international air traffic of the region, are indeed 
mainly localised in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
and Jordan (panel A of Figure 3). This strongly reduces 
the traffic capacity of the ME region, as well as the 
corresponding likelihood of exporting cases out of the 
region, when the restricted hypothesis on the source 
region is considered. An analysis based on cluster data 
only would remain unchanged and would not be able to 
detect important variations in the epidemic size esti-
mation. This result further indicates the relevance of 
air travel in the epidemic assessment and therefore the 
need for an integrative approach also based on mobil-
ity and space. It also implies that improving the knowl-
edge of the geographical extent of the source region is 
critical, along with the identification of the virus’ path 
of transmission to humans. 
These results are obtained under the assumption of 
homogeneous sensitivity of the surveillance systems 
of the restricted set of countries in western Europe 
with case importations considered in Method 2. The 
further application of this approach to a wider range of 
countries or other outbreaks would require the assess-
ment of the sensitivity of the surveillance systems of 
the affected countries. 
Changes in time of countries’ public health actions for 
surveillance and control of the MERS-CoV epidemic 
certainly occurred in response to the increasingly avail-
able emerging evidence and the higher awareness of 
the disease, however data are too scarce to provide 
estimates of the reproductive number as a function of 
time R(t). Here we assumed a constant R for the period 
under study, with the underlying assumption of a con-
stant and homogeneous implementation of interven-
tion measures in the region. 
Other possible factors leading to variations of the 
current situation may be pathogen- and host-related. 
Evolution of the MERS-CoV virus to adapt to humans 
and reach sustainable and efficient human-to-human 
transmission represents a potential future scenario, as 
it happened for SARS [26]. Seasonality may also affect 
virus transmissibility. We tested for possible variations 
of R and psp estimates by comparing two different points 
in time (end of May and end of August 2013) and found 
no significant change, except for a reduction of the CIs 
following a larger dataset available for the estimation. 
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Given the available data, this result seems to indicate 
that no variation in the rate of introductions and in the 
transmissibility of the virus has occurred in the period 
from May to August 2013 that may point to differences 
in the transmission to humans or to viral adaptations to 
human hosts. Furthermore, the crude notification data 
from the affected countries do not provide any epide-
miological evidence of a seasonality of the epidemic. 
On the other hand, if compared to the reported number 
of sporadic cases at the two dates, our psp estimates 
are in favour of an increase in sporadic case ascer-
tainment as the estimated under-ascertainment rate 
has decreased from 2.2–17.5 considering cases up to 
31 May to 1.03–7.32 up to 31 August. Further data to 
update the integrative approach will contribute to pro-
vide a continuous assessment of the outbreak in case 
an evolving situation is suspected. 
Other events that are related to human movements and 
mixing may as well alter the assessed scenario. Vast 
international mass gatherings annually taking place in 
Saudi Arabia are known to bring large number of pil-
grims to the affected area, with expected increased 
rates of local mixing that may favour the transmis-
sion of the virus, followed by a potential amplification 
of its international dissemination due to the return of 
pilgrims to their own countries [27]. The occurrence of 
these large scale events calls for additional studies in 
pilgrims’ screening [28] next to enhanced local surveil-
lance in the region and guidance to local authorities 
[29] that would help to assess and control possible 
changes in time in the virus transmission. 
Air travel clearly represents the main mean for global 
spatial spread of infectious disease epidemics in the 
modern world, as it was previously experienced with 
SARS and the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic 
[16,17,30-32]. Besides seasonal variations due to spe-
cific events (e.g. mass gatherings) or in/out flows 
of expatriates for seasonal jobs, a potential emerg-
ing pandemic in the ME area would constitute a very 
high risk for considerably rapid and wide international 
spread. The ME area indeed covers a central role in 
connecting different regions of the world and has wit-
nessed a dramatic increase of traffic growth in the last 
decade (153% of relative increase in Saudi Arabia in 
the period from 2002 to 2011, 240% in Jordan, 408% 
in Qatar, 512% in the United Arab Emirates, against a 
global relative increase of 168%) [23]. Analysis of the 
air traffic data integrated into GLEAM suggests that 
other countries than the ones already affected are at 
high risk of MERS-CoV importation through infected 
passengers, in particular in the southern regions of 
Asia (Figure 2), similarly to reference [27]. Should the 
outbreak evolve in a self-sustained epidemic, such risk 
assessment analyses cannot rely on travel data only 
and would require the full integration of the air travel 
data with an epidemic model, as in GLEAM, to explic-
itly simulate the evolving epidemic, estimate importa-
tion likelihood [31] and provide predictions for future 
stages of the epidemic [17,33].
With a subcritical epidemic in the ME region associ-
ated with a large potential for international dissemina-
tion, priority for the epidemic control should be given 
to the identification of the transmission of infection 
to humans to limit sporadic cases, to the reduction 
of human-to-human transmission through rapid case 
identification and isolation, and to the enhancement 
of surveillance systems in those countries that are at 
a higher risk of importation because of travel flows to/
from the affected area. 
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